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ABSTRACT 
 
Allowing foreign strategic investors (FSIs) to hold minority stake in Chinese banks is very important for China’s 
banking. Based on data of 221 commercial banks from 2007 to 2015, we use difference in differences (DID) and 
propensity score matching (PSM) to investigate the effects of shareholding of FSIs on pricing of wealth management 
products (WMPs) for banks in China from single product view and every bank view. Besides, we further investigate 
the effects of bank ownership on above relationship. We find that FSIs’ acquisitions significantly enhance the expected 
rate of return of WMPs on both levels, however decrease the deviation of return of WMPs on single product level but 
have no evident effects on bank level. Finally, we find that the impact of acquisitions from foreign banks depend on 
Chinese banks’ ownership structure. Specifically, the effects of FSIs’ acquisitions on pricing of WMPs are positive 
for state-owned banks (SOBs), while are negative for city commercial banks.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
nterest rate reform and financial disintermediation are important drivers for China’s banks to change their 
income structure (Cheng, Zhao, Zhou, 2016). In 1996, interbank lending rates were officially liberalized, 
marking the beginning of the marketization of interest rate. Then, in 2004, the ceiling limit of loan and 
the floor limit of deposit interest rate were respectively liberalized. However, the interest rate was still controlled 
before 2013 and Chinese banks can get monopolistic profits from the interest spread, and no impetus for them to 
increase other business. From July 2013, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) has begun to lift the interest rates controls 
gradually. Finally, in October 2015, deposit rates in China were set free. The process of ongoing interest rate 
liberalization narrows the interest spread, thus decreasing the main income from interest activities. Chinese banks 
have to resort to non-interest businesses (Li & Zhang, 2013; Cheng, Zhao & Zhang, 2014), and wealth management 
products (WMPs) particular. WMPs, also named as asset management products or financial products, are issued by 
banks in China, and may be based off stocks, bonds or loans, and shares, and can be sold to investors.  They are similar 
to structured products (SPs) in other countries which was mentioned by Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005). And, most 
WMPs are off-balance sheet items, which can help banks to avoid the supervision from Chinese government, such as 
PBOC and China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) to a great degree. By the end of June 2016, there were 
68961 outstanding WMPs, valued at 26.28 trillion RMB (about $3.96 trillion), and the number of issuers were 454. 
In the first half of 2016, up to 97636 WMPs were issued in the banking financial markets, raising money 83.98 trillion 
RMB (about $12.66 trillion). WMPs constitute an important part of Chinese banks’ non-income business evidently. 
Furthermore, with the development of economy, Chinese people are richer than before. As of late December 2015, 
China's GDP has reached 676708 billion RMB (about $102049.10), with GDP per capita about 52000 RMB ($ 
7841.72). Urban residents per capita disposable income is about 31195 RMB ($4704.28), with rural residents per 
I 
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capita disposable income about 11422 RMB ($1722.46), and individuals are looking for better options to invest their 
money. 
 
Authors, such as Cheng et al. (2016); Berger, Hasan & Zhou, (2009); Firth, Lin, Liu & Wong (2009); Fu and Heffernan 
(2009) have mentioned that, from 2003, PBOC begins to implement a series of ownership reforms. Among all the 
measures, FSIs' acquisitions are very important. By the end of 2015, forty-three of China’s banks have FSIs. All four 
state owned banks (SOBs), 11 joint-equity banks, and 28 other kinds of banks (mainly city or rural commercial banks) 
are in listed. Table A-1 lists the status of the Chinese banks that have FSIs. Our paper tries to study the impacts of 
FSIs on pricing of WMPs from 2007 to 2015 for banks in China.  
 
Specifically, our paper tries to study the topic by answering three questions: (1) What is the impact of foreign banks’ 
acquisitions on pricing of WMPs? (2) How about the relationship between the shareholding percentage of foreign 
banks and pricing of WMPs? (3) What is the different relationship among SOBs and other banks? In this paper, pricing 
of WMPs is measured by Average Expected Rate of Return(AER)and Average Margin of Return (AMR) following 
the research by Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) to show expected rate of return of WMPs and the deviation of return 
of WMPs. Using data from 221 banks in China from 2007 to 2015, we combine the PSM and DID approaches (Cheng 
et al. 2016) to investigate the effects of FSIs on the pricing of WMPs and get the following findings. First of all, 
foreign banks’ acquisitions have increased the expected rate of return of every single WMP and all WMPs for a bank. 
This is mainly due to the combined effects from technology spillover effects and supervisory effect. Second, FSIs’ 
acquisitions have significantly narrowed the deviation of return of every single WMP but has no significant influence 
on all WMPs for a bank. These results indicate that Chinese banks that have FSIs pay more attention to the 
development of WMPs with high yields, which can bring more clients and cash into banks, thus improving the overall 
income of WMPs and bank performance. Then, with the increase of ownership shares of FSIs, expected rate of return 
of bank-level WMPs increases significantly, but there is no significant change in the deviation of return. Finally, the 
nature of bank ownership can also affect above relationship, we find that FSIs’ acquisitions narrow the deviation of 
return of SOBs but opposite for city-commercial banks, this is possibly because SOBs are generally more skilled in 
personnel training and organization management, so they can absorb better from the technology spillover effects. This 
paper has four contributions. First, as one of the most important parts of non-interest income business, there is no 
research to report the impacts of FSIs on WMPs. We adopt DID method to enrich the relevant empirical research. 
Second, current literature about FSIs’ acquisitions mainly focus on efficiency and performance of a bank or all banks 
on the country level. In this paper, we study the relationships on the single product level and bank level both. Finally, 
to detect true treatment impact of foreign banks on WMPs, we use DID and PSM to control endogeneity problem and 
selection bias. 
 
Then, section 2 introduces research background. Section 3 presents the relevant literature. Section 4 is sample, models, 
and variables. Section 5 discusses the research findings, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
Berger et al. (2009) and Chen and Liao (2011) review China’s banking reforms. And Cheng et al. (2016) reviews the 
history for FSIs to buy banks in China in detail.  So, we only review the development of WMPs in China. 
 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) began to provide consulting and advisory services about WMPs to 
its customers at the end of last century, which can be taken as prototype of WMPs in China. In 2003, Bank of China 
(BOC) issued the first foreign currency-based WMP, namely “Treasure”. After this, many other banks in China, such 
as Standard of Chartered Bank, China Merchants Bank, China Minsheng Banking Corporation, Guangdong 
Development Bank and so on, launched a lot of foreign currency-based WMPs quickly. In the following year, the first 
RMB-based WMP in China was issued, namely “Sunshine Finance Plan B” by China Everbright Bank, and the fund 
raised was invested in Chinese inter-bank bond market.  
 
From 2003 to 2008, WMPs in China developed rapidly. During this phase, WMPs are mainly foreign currency based, 
such as US dollar, Hong Kong dollar and Euro. In 2005, the big four SOBs, that is BOC, Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), ICBC, and China Construction Bank (CCB) began to enter RMB WMPs market. In 2007, Bank of East Asia 
(BEA), the Hong Kong's largest independent local bank, launched its first RMB financial product in mainland of 
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China. Since then, the competition of China's WMPs became increasingly fierce. Correspondingly, CBRC issued 
“Interim measures on personal financing business of commercial banks” and “Guidelines on risk management of 
commercial banks”, guiding the development of WMPs market in Chinese banking industry.  
 
However, in 2008, the outbreak of global financial crisis, had a certain negative effect on Chinese banking WMPs 
market. For example, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank cannot pay the promised interest to its investors and some 
domestic and foreign banks in China even reported negative rate of returns for WMPs. Some cases of defaults have 
led government to face the risks of these financial instruments. Then, CBRC issued “Notice on standardizing personal 
financing business of commercial banks”, emphasizing the assessment and control of the risks of WMPs. In addition, 
the promulgation of “Guideline on the cooperation between bank and trust company” by CBRC, offers a new idea for 
the development of WMPs, since 2009, the development speed of WMPs slowed gradually. Although the amount of 
WMPs issued in 2009 had a slight increase compared with year 2008, the average annual yield for WMPs in 2009 
dropped dramatically. In July 2009, CBRC promulgated “Notice on the management of investment for personal 
financing business of commercial banks” to show the investment scope restrictions on funds raised by financial 
products, especially for complicated WMPs and specific equities etc.  
 
Year 2013 to now is the specification development stage of WMPs. PBOC gradually strengthened the supervision for 
banks by loan-to-deposit ratio, limiting the expansion of the on-balance sheet assets. So, banks are driven to bypass 
regulations and develop WMPs financing. The rapid development of financial service business reflects the effects of 
the monetary policy, and, its opaque asset pool operation model brought liquidity risk, term mismatch risk and 
payment risk, which caused the attention of the authorities. Then, CBRC issued the “Notice on investment operation 
of WMPs of commercial banks” emphasizing the importance of WMPs risk prevention and control further. In 2014, 
CBRC regulated the entry of WMPs into bond market to solve the WMPs business risk transfer and rigid payment 
problems, and explored the new mode of WMPs business serving the real economy. In the meantime, promoting the 
WMPs business compliance and reasonable transformation of WMPs market in China. 
 
With the marketization of interest rates and financial disintermediation, WMPs have become a new business profit 
point for banks of China. From the developing history of WMPs, we can find a fast increase in the number issued. By 
late December 2015, there were 60879 WMPs, and the number of issuing banks increased from 14 in 2004 to 127 in 
2015. The number of Chinese banking WMPs issued is as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1.	The amount of WMPs 
 
 
 
We notice that SOBs and joint-equity banks are main issuers. SOBs started to issue RMB WMPs in 2005, then 
maintain a high share in the market. However, since March 2015, the funds balance from the joint-equity commercial 
banks WMPs exceeded the five big SOBs. Money balances and market share of all banking financial institutions in 
2013-2015 are as shown in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. The balance and percentage of WMPs by different kinds of banks 
 
 
 
Furthermore, capital guaranteed WMPs is the mainstream. The market share of capital guaranteed WMPs is much 
higher than other kinds of WMPs. By the end of December 2015, the balances of non-capital guaranteed WMPs rose 
by 7% compared with year 2014, but the balances of capital guaranteed floating WMPs and income guaranteed 
products relatively fell by 6.2% and 0.8% respectively. Finally, investors prefer medium and long term WMPs. As of 
late December 2015, the balance of short-term WMPs within three months accounts for about 27.54% of enclosed 
products size, while the medium and long-term WMPs more than 3 months account for about 72.46% of enclosed 
products size. The cases of funds raised from WMPs with different durations from year 2013 to 2015 are shown in 
Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3：The percentage of WMPs with different durations 
 
 
 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Cheng et al. (2016) review the literature on FSIs in financial sector in detail. We know that the similar studies mainly 
focused on the impact of foreign banks on efficiency, performance and risk of domestic banks in the research field of 
bank privatization with mixed results, such as Lin and Zhang (2009), Shen, Lu & Wu (2009), García-Herrero, Gavilá 
& Santabárbara (2009), Berger et al. (2009), Lu et al. (2010), Xu (2011),  Jiang, Yao & Feng (2013), Sun, Harimaya 
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& Yamori (2013) and Hasan and Xie (2013). Some papers focus on the measures beside bank performance or risk. 
For example, Zhao et al. (2014) study the impact of foreign banks’ acquisitions on NIM (net interest margins) from 
1995 to 2010, and notice that foreign banks' acquisitions reduce NIM in China. Wu, Shen & Lu (2012) and Wu, Shen 
& Lu (2015) examine how FSIs affect earnings management. Here, we just focus on the studies on WMPs in banking. 
 
Research on pricing of WMPs is mainly focused on SPs. And relevant studies are mostly concentrate on pricing for 
SPs. Almost all pricing model studies are based on capital asset pricing (CAMP) model (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; 
Mossin, 1966) and Black - Sholes option pricing model (1973). Such as Chen and Kensinger (1990), Chen and Sears 
(1990), Brown and Davis (2004), Benet, Giannetti & Pissaris (2006), Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005) and Burtschell 
and Gregory (2009).  
 
Besides, some literature studies the investment decision making process for SPs from investors’ behavior. Such as 
Fischer (2007); Ofir and Wiener (2012); Dobeli and Vanini (2010); Erner, Klos, & Langer, (2013); Sanjiv and Statman 
(2013). 
 
From above on, we know that the literature concerning about FSIs mainly focuses on performance and risk of a single 
bank or the stability for the banking industry. And the literature of WMPs’ has not examined the relationship between 
FSIs and WMPs yet. We predict FSIs could affect the pricing of WMPs because of spillover effect and supervisory 
effect.  
 
4. SAMPLE, METHODS, AND VARIABLES 
 
4.1 Sample and Data 
 
For WMPs, we collect data from Wind database, and we get statutory statements by hand collecting from banks. Some 
information is from website of CBRC’s and National Bureau of Statistics of China. We start with 56172 WMPs issued 
from January 1, 2007 to December 31, 2015 by 221 banks. After sample selection process, we get 221 commercial 
banks and 42350 efficient WMPs observations. Among above banks, there is 1 foreign banks, 5 SOBs, 12 joint-stock 
banks, 122 city commercial banks and 81 rural financial institutions. By the end of year 2015, 40 banks have had the 
FSIs’ acquisitions, 19 of which have been listed on the exchanges. The distribution of observations is shown in Table 
1. 
 
 
Table 1. Distribution of Observations 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
No. of WMPs 8 74 413 1743 3722 5613 7753 15598 7426 
ER(%) 11.00 5.21 1.90 2.11 4.07 4.29 4.60 5.04 4.69 
AER(%) 7.95 6.38 3.12 2.83 4.71 4.74 4.84 5.19 4.78 
Note: This table is summarized and computed from Wind Database; The No. of WMPs in 2015 is less because many WMPs issued are outstanding 
by the year end. 
 
 
4.2 Methods 
 
This paper employs DID (See Roberts and Whited, 2012) to test the effects of FSIs on the pricing of WMPs. The 
processes of DID can be seen in Cheng et al. (2016). Based on the technology spillover effect and supervisory effect, 
we first examine the effect of FSIs’ acquisitions on Expected Rate of Return of every single WMP. 
 
ERijt= Constant + a1*FSI + a2* FSI_T + b*Control + r*Year +εijt      Model (1) 
 
Then, according to the research of pricing deviation by Stoimenov and Wilkens (2005), we put forward Model (2) to 
examine the impact of FSIs on Margin of Return of every single WMP. 
 
MRijt=Constant + a1* FSI + a2 FSI_T + b*Control + r*Year +εijt  Model (2)  
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Furthermore, based on Model (1), taking the funds raised from different WMPs as the weight, we further analyze the 
effect of FSIs on AER for all WMPs issued by every bank in each year. 
 
AERit=Constant + a1* FSI + a2 FSI_T + b*Control + r*Year +εit Model (3) 
 
Similarly, based on Model (2), we further analyze the impact of FSIs on WMPs on the bank level. 
 
AMRit= Constant + a1* FSI + a2 FSI_T + b*Control + r*Year +εit Model (4)  
 
Finally, this paper also studies the effects of FSIs' shareholding on the AER and AMR of banks which have already 
had FSIs’ acquisitions from the bank level.   
 
AERit= Constant + a1FSISit + b*Control + r*Year +ε Model (5)  
 
AMRit= Constant + a1FSISit + b*Control + r*Year +ε Model (6)  
 
4.3 Variables 
 
4.3.1 Pricing 
 
This paper employs ER (Expected Rate of Return) and AER (Average Expected Rate of Return) to measure the pricing 
level of WMPs, in addition, we also adopt two indicators of MR (Margin of Return) and AMR (Average Margin of 
Return) to measure the deviation from actual rate of return. For example, ERijt measures the expected return of single 
WMP j of Bank i issued in the Year t, correspondingly, AERit measures the expected return of all WMPs of Bank i 
issued in the Year t, that is AERit=∑αjtERijt; Similarly, MRijt measures the deviation of ERijt from actual return and 
AMRit measures the deviation of AERit from actual return. 
 
4.3.2 FSIs 
 
FSI equals 1 if banks has FSIs and 0 otherwise. T equals 1 after a bank has FSIs (the second year after acquisition) 
and 0 before this bank has FSIs. We employ FSI_T as the interaction variable. Additionally, following the papers by 
Berger et al. (2009) and Wu, Shen & Lu (2015), we employ FSIS (FSI Share) to further explore the impact of 
ownership shares of FSIs on the return of WMPs.  
 
4.3.3 Control Variables 
 
First, we employ different characteristics of WMPs as control variables, including Duration period of WMPs (DAY), 
The cash starting point of purchase (CS), Percentage protected of WMPs (PER), Logarithm of capital raised (CAP), 
Area (A), Gainway (WAY), Product Structure (PS), Currency (CUR), and Customer Type (CT). 
 
Then, based on the research by Cheng et al. (2014), we also employ bank comprehensive indicators and detailed 
financial indicators as control variables, including Asset Size (SIZE), Return on Assets (ROA), Spread (SP), Bank 
Efficiency (EFF), Loan to Deposit Ratio (LD), Non-Interest Income (NII), List (LIST) and Ownership (OW). Finally, 
we summarize all variables into the following table. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2018 Volume 34, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 199 The Clute Institute 
Table 2. Variable Measures 
Variables Definitions 
ER Taking the average when it is an interval 
AER Taking funds raised as weight α, AERit=∑αERijt ( i: bank t:year, j:WMP) 
MR [(Actual return-Expected return) /Expected return]*100% 
AMR (Actual average return-Expected Average Return)/Expected Average Return)*100% 
FSI Equals 1 if banks had FSIs and 0 otherwise 
T Equals 1 after a bank had FSIs (the second year after acquisition) and 0 before this bank had FSIs 
FSIS Ownership shares of FSIs 
DAY Duration period of WMPs, counted by “day” 
CS Cash starting point of purchase 
PER Percentage protected of WMPs 
CAP Logarithm of capital raised 
A Equals 1 if WMPs are issued nationwide and 0 otherwise 
WAY Equals 1 for floating return and 0 for fixed return 
PS Equal 1 for structured products and 0 for non-structured products  
CUR Equals 1 for foreign currency and 0 for RMB 
CT Equals 0 for individual, 1for organization, 2 for individual and organization,3 for VIP  
SIZE Logarithm of bank’s total assets 
ROA ROA=Net Profit/Total Assets 
EFF Bank relative efficiency, computed from DEA model taking operating expenditure and net non-current assets as inputs, and interest and non-interest income as outputs, ranging from 0 to 1 
LD LD=Loan/Deposit 
SP Spread=(Interest income-Interest expenditure)/total assets 
NII Percentage of non-interest income, that is (fees and commissions)/[(fees and commissions)+interest income] 
LIST Equals 1 if banks are listed and 0 otherwise 
DLIST Equals 1 after a bank listed (the second year after listing) and 0 before this bank is not listed 
OW Equals 0 for SOBs, 1 for joint-stock banks, 2 for city commercial banks, 3 for rural financial institutions  
 
 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
In this session, we first study the effects of FSIs on pricing of every single WMP, including expected rate of return 
(ER) and the deviation of rate of return (MR). Then, we explore the effects of FSIs on pricing of all WMPs for every 
bank, because different banks issue different numbers of WMPs. Finally, this paper studies the interaction effects 
between FSIs and ownership, including ownership nature and FSIs shareholding, on AER and AMR of every single 
WMP and bank level WMPs. 
 
5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
For Models (1) - (2), we have 42350 WMPs of 221 Chinese banks. To further explore the impact of FSIs’ acquisitions 
on the pricing of WMPs on every bank, our new observations are 341 after weighted average summation. Because 
one bank could issue a number of WMPs in one year. Tables 3 and 4 report the descriptive statistics for all the 
variables.  
 
In Table 3, the max value of ER, 6.4, with min value 1.43 shows that there are apparent differences of expectation of 
rate of return for different WMPs. And the descriptive statistics of FSI and T show that the volume of WMPs has 
witnessed a rise after FSIs’ acquisitions. 
 
The max value of AER, 11.740, with min value 1.760 in Table 4 shows that banks have different level of rate of return 
for the WMPs they have issued for every year. Mean value of FSI, 0.469, with median value, 0, shows that there are 
more Chinese banks which have no FSIs partners.  
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Table 3. Summary of Descriptive Statistics for every WMP 
Variables N. Mean Std. Dev. Min Med. Max 
ER 42350 4.560 1.060 1.430 4.8 6.400 
FSI 42350 0.649 0.477 0 1 1 
T 42350 0.626 0.484 0 1 1 
DAY 42350 98.010 82.812 7 73 365 
CS 42350 11.415 1.414 8.987 10.820 17.217 
PER 42350 56.624 50.761 0 100 105.600 
CAP 42350 7.103 15.409 0.010 2.15 100.500 
A 42350 0.764 0.425 0 1 1 
WAY 42350 0.707 0.455 0 1 1 
PS 42350 0.070 0.255 0 0 1 
M 42350 0.030 0.172 0 0 1 
CT 42350 0.726 0.981 0 0 3 
Note: See Table 2 for the variable definitions. 
 
 
Table 4. Summary of Descriptive Statistics for WMPs of Different Banks in One Year 
Variables N. Mean Std. Dev. Mini. Med. Max. 
AER 341 4.828 1.474 1.760 4.910 11.740 
FSI  341 0.469 0.500 0 0 1 
T 341 0.411 0.493 0 0 1 
SIZE 341 17.195 1.805 14.490 16.613 21.323 
ROA 341 0.010 0.003 0.002 0.010 0.019 
SP 341 2.360 0.718 0.802 2.378 4.342 
EFF 341 0.629 0.203 0.265 0.607 1.000 
LD 341 0.110 0.050 0.000 0.104 0.295 
NII 341 0.061 0.041 0.007 0.049 0.179 
DLIST 341 0.290 0.455 0 0 1 
LIST 341 0.334 0.472 0 0 1 
OW 341 1.745 0.838 0 2 3 
Note: See Table 2 for the variable definitions. 
 
 
5.2 FSIs and Pricing of Single WMP 
 
We study the impact of foreign banks on ER and MR of every single WMP according to Models (1) - (2). The results 
are seen in Table 5.     
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Table 5. Effects of FSIs on ER&MR 
Variables ER MR MR (1) (2) (2) Sub-sample 
FSI  0.238
*** -0.063 -0.055 
(12.750) (-1.180) (-1.025) 
FSI_T 1.377
*** -0.231 -0.037 
(22.660) (-0.296) (-0.047) 
FSI_TOP - - -0.035   (-0.384) 
FSI_T_TOP - - -0.536
*** 
  (-2.717) 
DAY 0.002
*** 0.005 -0.001 
(48.030) (0.177) (-0.633) 
CS 0.036
*** 0.028 0.019 
(12.280) (0.918) (0.635) 
PER -0.006
*** -0.002*** -0.003*** 
(-78.030) (-3.622) (-4.143) 
CAP -0.005
*** 0 0 
(-21.670) (-0.760) (-0.664) 
A -0.263 0.262
*** 0.249*** 
(-1.034) (4.477) (4.195) 
WAY 0.037
*** 0.319*** 0.325*** 
(3.610) (3.688) (3.763) 
PS -0.887
*** 16.640*** 16.600*** 
(-68.200) (38.730) (38.580) 
M -1.435
*** - - (-70.560) 
CT Control Control Control 
Year Control Control Control 
Constant 4.462
*** 9.357*** 9.392*** 
(19.790) (14.430) (14.490) 
N 42,350 6,295 6,295 
F  3823.04 109.85 99.35 
P  0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.655 0.238 0.238 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable measurements. 
 
 
As shown in Table 5, we find that the effect of FSI and FSI_T on the expected return of WMPs is positively significant 
at 1% level, that is, FSIs’ acquisitions can significantly improve the expected return of every single WMP of Chinese 
banks. We can explain this with spillover effect and supervisory effect. First, with experienced skills, FSIs can guide 
Chinese banks to carry out adequate investigation of target markets for every WMP and set an attractive high yield. 
And Chinese banks will be more talented in pricing of WMPs with the help of FSIs. Second, in the management 
practice, FSIs to hold minority stake can exert more effective supervision on WMPs of Chinese banks to avoid high 
risks, including issue risk. A number of studies have supported that the FSIs’ acquisitions is conducive to the 
improvement of corporate governance and risk control ability (Aggarwal, Erel & Ferreira, 2011; Blomström, 1986; 
137; Zhang & Li, 2010). At the same time, the supervisory effect of FSIs is conducive to the prevention of moral 
hazard in China's banks (Tirole, 2001), promoting the healthy development of China's banking WMPs business and 
improving the pricing of WMPs. 
 
It also can be seen from Table 5 that FSI and FSI_T in the regression model (2) are negatively correlated with MR of 
WMPs, indicating that FSIs’ acquisitions can reduce the gap between actual yield deviation and expected rate of 
return, but this relationship is not significant, so we set up a dummy variable TOP, which equals 1 when ER of WMPs 
are in the first 50% of all products, and 0 otherwise. Then, we set the interaction variable of FSI and FSI_T with TOP. 
Results show that FSI_T_TOP and MR of WMPs are negatively significant at 1% level, indicating that the yield 
deviation of the WMPs has been significantly narrowed after FSIs’ acquisitions, whose returns rank first 50% of all 
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products. Besides, this also implies that the Chinese banks which have FSIs partners focus more on development of 
high yield products, mainly because those products can keep more customers and raise more funds, thus increasing 
the overall yield level of WMPs and banks’ performance. 
 
5.3 FSIs and Pricing of WMPs on Bank Level 
 
Every bank could issue different kinds of WMPs. We calculate AER and AMR based on the funds raised by different 
WPMs in one year. Then, we explore the impacts of FSIs and the shareholding of FSIs on AER and AMR of WMPs 
for every sample bank according to Models (3) – (4). The results can be seen in Table 6. 
 
 
Table 6. Effects of FSIs on AER&AMR of Bank Level 
Variables AER AMR AER AMR 
FSI -0.0820 2.988   (-0.496) (1.045)   
FSI_T 1.225
** -6.970   
(1.983) (-0.896)   
FSIS   0.0357
** -0.187 
  (2.134) (-0.448) 
SIZE -0.173
* -1.698 0.245 0.609 
(-1.787) (-0.985) (1.057) (0.115) 
ROA -41.12 -135.8 -322.7
*** -8,279** 
(-1.626) (-0.375) (-3.984) (-2.288) 
SP 0.293
** -3.622** 2.806*** 30.01 
(2.564) (-2.073) (6.449) (1.666) 
EFF 1.098
** 8.303 3.990*** 59.88* 
(2.578) (1.158) (3.677) (1.787) 
LD 0.881 -14.33 -4.896 67.32 (0.599) (-0.492) (-1.563) (1.068) 
NII -1.901 -75.70
*** -13.00** -340.0 
(-0.726) (-2.784) (-1.982) (-1.553) 
DLIST -0.696
* 20.83** -1.367** 16.88 
(-1.752) (2.476) (-2.109) (0.663) 
LIST 0.905
** -7.551 1.936*** 14.58 
(2.179) (-1.145) (2.647) (0.707) 
OW Control Control Control Control 
Year Control Control Control Control 
Constant 9.104
*** 84.79** -6.344 -11.88 
(4.812) (2.520) (-1.343) (-0.097) 
N 341 89 143 31 
F  16.88 4.71 7.22 2.84 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 
Adjusted R2 0.495 0.458 0.345 0.424 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable measurements. 
 
 
Table 6 shows that the expected return of WMPs of Chinese banks with FSIs will be higher than that of Chinese banks 
without FSIs, but this gap is not significant. However, the impact of FSI_T on the expected return of WMPs on bank 
level is positively at 5% level significantly, this means that the banks will issue WMPs with higher AER after they 
have foreign partners compared with that before FSIs’ acquisitions, and banks without foreign partners. That is, foreign 
financial institutions will significantly increase the AER of WMPs of their Chinese partners. We also find that from 
Table 6, the acquisition of FSIs doesn’t significantly affect AMR, this may be due to the limited disclosure of actual 
yield to maturity of financial products and limited sample number. Furthermore, in Table 6, the FSIS has positive 
effects on the AER, indicating that the higher shareholding of FSIs, the higher expected yield of WMPs on bank level. 
The result supports Fries and Taci (2005) and Berger et al. (2009). But the effect of FSIS on AMR is not significant, 
that is, the share of FSIs has no significant effect on the deviation of return of bank-level WMPs. The limited disclosure 
of actual yield to maturity and sample number may be the possible reasons.  
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5.4 FSIs, Ownership Structure, and Pricing of WMPs 
 
OLS regression estimates for Models (5) - (6) with AER and AMR as the dependent variables are shown in Table 7. 
Here, we pay attention to the interaction variables (FSI_T_BIG, FSI_T_JIO, FSI_T_CITY), so we set three dummy 
variables: BIG, JIO and CITY to represent SOBs, joint-stock banks and city commercial banks respectively. We do 
not include rural financial institutions because they have no FSIs partners yet.  
 
 
Table 7. Interaction Effects between FSIs and Ownership Nature on AER and AMR of Bank-Level WMPs 
Variables AER AMR AER AMR AER AMR 
FSI -0.091 2.988 -0.090 2.578 -0.116 2.377 (-0.550) (1.045) (-0.541) (0.892) (-0.695) (0.803) 
FSI_T 1.307
** 9.029 1.140* 6.867 1.375** 10.06 
(2.107) (1.140) (1.814) (0.883) (2.202) (1.164) 
FSI_T_BIG 1.827 22.910 - - - - (1.278) (1.541) 
FSI_T_JIO - -  
1.016 41.540 - - (0.759) (1.006) 
FSI_T_CITY - -  - - 
-1.578* -22.370 
(-1.909) (-0.827) 
SIZE -0.158 -1.698 -0.157 -1.348 -0.136 -1.260 (-1.620) (-0.985) (-1.574) (-0.767) (-1.365) (-0.697) 
ROA -44.240
* -135.800 -38.530 -148.200 -39.560 -151.800 
(-1.743) (-0.375) (-1.509) (-0.409) (-1.567) (-0.418) 
SP 0.310
*** -3.622** 0.291** -3.387* 0.300*** -3.520** 
(2.692) (-2.073) (2.537) (-1.922) (2.625) (-2.005) 
EFF 1.085
** 8.303 1.090** 7.795 1.078** 7.223 
(2.547) (1.158) (2.556) (1.085) (2.534) (0.989) 
LD 0.854 -14.330 1.010 -11.670 1.049 -10.340 (0.581) (-0.492) (0.682) (-0.400) (0.713) (-0.350) 
NII -1.928 -75.700
*** -2.099 -75.150*** -2.279 -75.830*** 
(-0.737) (-2.784) (-0.797) (-2.763) (-0.868) (-2.782) 
DLIST -0.897
** 20.830** -0.625 19.820** -0.752* 21.320** 
(-2.101) (2.476) (-1.528) (2.340) (-1.889) (2.522) 
LIST 1.045
** -7.551 0.819* -7.965 0.898** -8.246 
(2.435) (-1.145) (1.900) (-1.206) (2.167) (-1.238) 
OW Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Year Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Constant 8.312
*** 75.440** 8.902*** 80.040** 8.162*** 69.190* 
(4.179) (2.461) (4.657) (2.356) (4.107) (1.791) 
N 341 89 341 89 341 89 
F  16.88 4.71 16.11 4.54 16.28 4.50 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.496 0.458 0.494 0.458 0.497 0.455 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable measurements. 
 
 
As shown in column 5, only FSI_T_CITY is significant at 10% level, which means, the ownership nature of the city 
commercial banks will have a negative effect on FSIs’ improving AER of WMPs. This is due to the market structure 
view. City commercial banks have inherent disadvantage in non-income activities market in China. In order to 
compete for market share, the city commercial banks tend to issue WMPs with higher ER than the other banks. But 
after FSIs’ acquisitions, pricing rationality is important either. Chinese city commercial banks will price WMPs more 
carefully. FSI_T_CITY and FSI_T_JIO are not significant with AER, but their coefficients are positive, indicating 
that SOBs and joint-stock banks have positive impact on the relationship between FSIs and AER of WMPs. 
 
We can also see that from Table 7, the coefficients of the explanatory variables, FSI, FSI_T, FSI_T_BIG, FSI_T_JIO, 
and FSI_T_CITY are all not significant. This means that the entry of FSIs cannot significantly narrow the deviation 
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of the weighted average return of WMPs of banks, and the ownership nature of banks has no significant impact on 
this relationship. 
 
Then, we study the interaction effects of FSIs and Ownership structure on AER and AMR of bank-level WMPs. We 
present the results in Table 8. 
 
 
Table 8. Interaction Effects between FSIs and Ownership Structure on AER &AMR of Bank-Level WMPs 
Variables AER AMR AER AMR AER AMR 
FSIS 0.028
* 0.0074 0.029** 0.268 0.032** -0.129 
(1.897) (0.018) (2.051) (0.683) (2.087) (-0.297) 
FSIS_BIG 0.001 -2.110
* -  -  (0.035) (-1.773)   
FSIS_JIO -  0.021 2.503 -   (0.707) (0.629)  
FSIS_CITY -  -  -0.021 2.110
* 
  (-0.622) (1.773) 
SIZE 0.119 0.943 0.122 0.609 0.113 0.943 (0.588) (0.188) (0.605) (0.115) (0.561) (0.188) 
ROA -173.300
** -8,606** -174.900** -8,279** -165.700** -8,606** 
(-2.212) (-2.512) (-2.274) (-2.288) (-2.131) (-2.512) 
SP 1.810
*** 28.780 1.836*** 30.010 1.804*** 28.780 
(4.261) (1.689) (4.340) (1.666) (4.281) (1.689) 
EFF 1.781 41.810 1.754 59.880
* 1.833 41.810 
(1.579) (1.256) (1.568) (1.787) (1.635) (1.256) 
LD 0.549 74.400 0.804 67.320 1.146 74.400 (0.168) (1.246) (0.247) (1.068) (0.340) (1.246) 
NII -3.735 -398.900
* -3.244 -340.000 -4.139 -398.900* 
(-0.549) (-1.903) (-0.486) (-1.553) (-0.622) (-1.903) 
DLIST -0.986 23.150 -1.013
* 16.880 -0.929 23.150 
(-1.633) (0.951) (-1.714) (0.663) (-1.560) (0.951) 
LIST 1.407
** 13.200 1.388** 14.580 1.352** 13.200 
(2.129) (0.677) (2.110) (0.707) (2.038) (0.677) 
OW Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Year Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Constant -0.440 33.990 -0.604 -13.640 -0.439 36.970 (-0.103) (0.285) (-0.142) (-0.112) (-0.103) (0.309) 
No 143 31 143 31 143 31 
F  9.40 3.17 9.46 2.84 9.45 3.17 
P 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.022 0.000 0.014 
Adjusted R2 0.554 0.485 0.556 0.424 0.555 0.485 
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. See Table 2 for variable measurements. 
 
 
As shown in Table 8, FSIS has a positive effect on AER of WMPs on bank level, that is, with the increase of FSIs’ 
shareholding, the expected return of WMPs on bank level will increase accordingly. However, the coefficients of 
FSIS_BIG, FSIS_JIO and FSIS_CITY are all not significant with AER. That means that ownership nature cannot 
moderate the relationship between FSIs and AER of WMPs.  
 
Also, as shown in Table 8, the explanatory variable FSIS has no significant effect on AMR of WMPs, that is, with the 
increase of the shareholding of FISs, the yield deviation of WMPs will not change significantly correspondingly. 
However, the effect of the explanatory variables FSIS_BIG and FSIS_CITY on the proportion of FSIs and yield 
deviation of bank-level WMPs is significant. This means that if foreign partners hold more shares of SOBs, the yield 
deviation of SOBs’ WMPs will be narrower; but this is contrary for city commercial banks. We can explain it by the 
fact that SOBs are more mature in terms of personnel training and organization management, that is, SOBs have 
stronger learning ability than city commercial banks, thus absorbing technological spillover effect of FSIs better. 
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5.5 Robustness Test 
 
In order to eliminate the sample selection error and ensure the reliability of the causal conclusion, this paper uses the 
propensity score matching (PSM) to match the sample to get the net effect of FSIs on pricing of WMPs. According to 
Abadie and Imbens (2008), this paper will take whether taking on FSIs into Chinese banks as an experiment. The 
banks that have FSIs will be used as the experiment group, and banks that don’t have FSIs as the control group. 
According to the bank characteristics (such as ROA, the size of bank assets, the proportion of non-interest income, 
LD and the nature of ownership), we calculate the propensity score of each sample, then we match the banks that have 
FSIs and not have FSIs correspondingly, excluding the unsuccessful samples. Finally, we get 4902 observations for 
every WMP, and 320 observations for WMPs for a single bank as the treatment group. This paper uses the nearest 
neighbor method in Stata to match a bank that has not taken on FSIs for each bank in the experimental group. Such 
matching makes the experimental and control group most similar in propensity score, then two test groups with the 
same probability of taking on FSIs can be considered “randomly” assigned to the experimental and control group. The 
results are consistent with our former findings, but not tabulated for brevity. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
To examine the links between FSIs and WMPs, this paper uses 42350 WMPs issued by 221 commercial banks (1 
foreign bank, 5 SOBs, 12 joint-stock banks, 124 urban commercial banks and 81 rural financial institutions) from 
2007 to 2015, and get the following findings. First, the entry of FSIs has improved the expected return of WMP both 
on single level and bank level significantly. Then, the entry of FSIs has narrowed the yield deviation of high-yield 
WMPs of commercial banks in China, but has no significant effect on the yield deviation of WMPs on bank level. 
Finally, with the increase of the shareholding proportion of FSIs, the expected return of WMPs on bank level has 
increased significantly, but the yield deviation has not changed significantly. Our finding is meaningful for the banking 
ownership reforms in China and the development strategy of Chinese banks.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A-1. The Status of China's Banks taking on FSIs 
Chinese banks FSIs Acquisition Year 
Ownership 
Shares of 
FSIs (%) 
Exit 
Time 
Nature of 
Chinese 
Banks 
Bank of China 
Royal Bank of Scotland 2005 10 2009 
SOBs 
Fullerton Financial Holdings 2005 5 2007 
Swiss bank 2005 1.55 2008 
Asian Development Bank 2005 0.24 2012 
The Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 2006  0.19 — 
China Construction 
Bank 
Bank of America 2005 9.1 2009 
SOBs Bank of America 2008  2011 
Fullerton Financial Holdings  2005 5.1 — 
Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of 
China 
Goldman Sachs Group  2006 6.05 2010 
SOBs Allianz Group 2006 2.36 2009 
American Express Company 2006 0.47 2011 
Agricultural Bank of 
China Standard Chartered Bank 2010 0.37 — SOBs 
The Bank of 
Communications Hongkong Bank 2004 19.9 — Other 
China Minsheng Bank International Finance Corporation 2003 1.22 — Other 
Asia Financial Holdings  2004 4.55 2007 
Shanghai Pudong 
Development Bank 
Citigroup 
 2003 4.62 2012 Other 
Industrial Bank 
Deal TEDA Investment  2004 5 — 
Other International Finance Corporation 2004 4 2012 
Hang Seng Bank Limited 2004 15.98 — 
Shenzhen Development 
Bank 
U.S. Newbridge Capital Group 2004 17.89 2010 Other GE Capital 2004 7 2010 
Ping An Bank U.S. Newbridge Capital Group 2004 17.89 2010 Other 
Everbright Bank 
Asian Development Bank 1996 1.9 2007 
Other 
International Finance Corporation 1999 7 2007 
China Guangfa Bank 
Citibank 2006 20 — 
Other Waterhouse Investment 2006 8 2013 
IBM Credit 2006 4.74 — 
CITIC Bank Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria 2007 4.83 — Other 
Huaxia Bank 
Pangu Bank 2005 6.88 2007 
Other 
Deutsche Bank 2006 7.02 — 
Germany and Luxembourg 
Companies 2006 2.88 — 
Sal. Oppenheim Company 2006 4.08 — 
Evergrowing Bank Singapore's United Overseas Bank 2008 15.38 — Other 
Bohai Bank Standard Chartered Bank 2005 19.99 — Other 
Bank of Shanghai 
International Finance Corporation 1999 5 — 
Other International Finance Corporation 2001 2 2011 
Hongkong Bank 2001 8 — 
Hong Kong Commercial Bank 2001 3 — 
Bank of Nanjing International Finance Corporation 2001 15 2005 Other 
BNP Paribas 2005 19.2 — 
(Appendix continued on next page) 
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(Appendix continued) 
Chinese banks FSIs Acquisition Year 
Ownership 
Shares of 
FSIs (%) 
Exit 
Time 
Nature of 
Chinese 
Banks 
Bank of Beijing 
China Merchants Securities 
Standard Chartered-ING BANK 
N.V 
2005 19.9 — 
Other 
International Finance Corporation 2005 5 — 
Xi'an City Commercial 
Bank 
International Finance Corporation 2004 2.5 — Other 
Bank of Nova Scotia 2004 2.5 — 
Qilu Bank Commonwealth Bank of Australia 2004 10.68 — Other 
Hangzhou City 
Commercial Bank 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia 2005 19.92 —  Other 
Asian Development Bank 2006 5 — 
Nanchong City 
Commercial Bank 
BNP Paribas 2005 19.2 — 
Other German Investment and Development Co. 2005 10 — 
German Savings bank 2005 3.3 — 
Changsha City 
Commercial Bank International Finance Corporation 2004 20 2008 Other 
Bank of Ningbo Singapore's OCBC Bank 2006 12.2 — Other 
Bank of Tianjin ANZ Bank 2006 19.9 — Other 
Chongqing City 
Commercial Bank 
U.S. Investment Fund Carlyle 2006 7.99  Other Dah Sing Bank, Hong Kong 2006 17 — 
Qingdao Bank 
Intesa Sanpaolo, Italy 2007 19.99 — 
Other Rothschild Financial Group 
Holding Co. 2007 4.98 — 
Yantai Bank Hang Seng Bank 2008 20 — Other Wing Lung Bank 2008 4.98 — 
Xiamen Bank Fubon Bank (Hong Kong) Ltd. 2009 19.99 — Other 
Chengdu Bank Malaysia Hong Leong Bank 2007 19.99 — Other 
Bank of Yingkou Malaysia CIMB Bank Group 2008 19.99 — Other 
Union Bank of 
Hangzhou 
Rabobank 2006 10 — 
Other International Finance Corporation 2006 5 — 
Harbin Bank International Financial Institutions 2005  — Other 
Bank of Jilin Hana Bank 2010 18 — Other 
Shenzhen City 
Commercial Bank 
Bank of East Asia 
 2003 15 — Other 
Deyang Bank International Finance Corporation 2009 15 — Other 
Tianjin Binhai Rural 
Commercial  Bank International Finance Corporation 2008 10 — Other 
Shanghai Rural 
Commercial Bank ANZ Bank 2006 19.99 — Other 
Dalian Bank Tian An Investment 2003 10 — Other 
Bank of Ningxia The Bocg Investment Co. 2010 11 — Other 
Jiaozuo City 
Commercial Bank 
HK CTS 
 2012 19.99 — Other 
Huishang Bank Wkland Investment Co. 2013 16 — Other 
Note: These materials were collected from the banks’ public reports, relevant newspapers, and financial magazines. 
 
 
